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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 11, 1974, Respondent (hereinafter referred 
to as Plaintiff) caused a writ of attachment to be issued 
against one D-9 caterpillar in order to satisfy judgments 
previously obtained against Defendants General American Corpora-
tion (hereinafter referred to as GAC) and its President, Paul J. 
Angelos. Subsequently, Appellant (hereinafter referred to as 
Intervenor) moved to intervene in the present action--claiming 
that GAC had sold the aforementioned caterpillar to a Terra 
Corporation and that Terra Corporation had resold the caterpillar 
to Intervenor. Intervenor claims that he is a bona fide good 
faith purchaser of the caterpillar and that, therefore, Plaintiff 
wrongfully attached and levied on the caterpillar. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-1-15 (1953) establishes her right to attach the cater-
pillar and to execute on that attachment. It provides that: 
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent 
as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim 
has matured, may, as against any person, except 
a purchaser for fair consideration without knowl-
edge of the fraud at the time of the purchase or 
one who has derived title immediately or mediately 
from such a purchaser: 
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation 
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his 
claim; or, 
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy 
execution upon, the property conveyed. 
-1-
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Section 25-1-15, of course, presupposes th 
e existence 
1 
of a fraudulent conveyance under Utah Code Ann. § 25 
-1-4 (1953), 
However, the essence of a fraudulent conveyance under § 25_1-4 
is the same "fair consideration" concept which provides 
the basis I 
for determining whether Intervenor can qualify for the good faitr 
purchaser exception under§ 25-1-15. Therefore, discussionof I 
§ 25-1-4' s requirements will serve to establish both the existenc: 
of a fraudulent conveyance under § 25-1-4 and the failure 
of Intervenor to qualify under the good faith purchaser exception 
Of§ 25-1-15.l 
II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING 
THAT GAC FRAUDULENTLY CONVEYED THE CATERPILLAR TO TERRA 
CORPORATION AND THAT INTERVENOR DID NOT PURCHASE THE 
CATERPILLAR FOR "FAIR CONSIDERATION" FROM TERRA CORPORATION. 
A. Scope of Review. The question confronting the 
Court on this appeal: 
is whether the circumstances urged by the 
[Intervenor as mitigating against a finding of 
fraudulent conveyance] do so with such certainty 
that the [lower court] could not reasonably have 
believed the [Plaintiff's] evidence to the con-
trary .•.. It is to be borne in mind that ~n 
pursuing the duty of reviewing the evidence in a 
case in equity, this court makes considerable 
allowance for the advantaged position of the. 
[lower court] in close proximity to the parties 
and the witnesses which provides [it] a better 
1Plaintiff does not dispute Intervenor's contention th~\:~uritY 
ownership interest takes precedence over an unperfe~tef t 3_7, 
's Brie a interest in personal property. See Intervenor court's 
However, this contention is rendered moot by the lower a 
· 11 to Terr ruling that GAC' s conveyance of the caterpi ar t pillar 
Corporation and Terra Corporation's resale of th7 d ca e~gainst 
I 
to Intervenor were fraudulent and, therefore, voi as 
Plaintiff. 
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basis for insight into the truthfulness of the 
testimony offered than is afforded by a review 
of the record. Givan v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 
964 (Utah 1960). 
It is primarily for these reasons that the Court should not 
reverse unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
lower court's findings. See Nelson v. Nelson, 513 P.2d 1011, 
1013 (Utah 1973); Brimhall v. Grow, 480 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 
1971); and Givan v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 1960). 
B. The Evidence. Plaintiff prevailed in the lower 
court on her claim that GAC fraudulently conveyed the cater-
pillar to Terra Corporation and Intervenor in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-4 (1953) (see Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, R. 210-214). Section 25-1-4 provides that: 
Every conveyance made, and every obligation 
incurred, by a person who is, or will be 
thereby rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as 
to creditors, without regard to his actual 
intent, if the conveyance is made or the obli-
gation is incurred without a fair consideration. 
Both the statute and case law interpreting the statute 
make it clear that subjective or actual intent to defraud are 
not elements of a fraudulent conveyance claim. See First Security 
Bank of Utah v. Vrontikis Bros., Inc., 490 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 
1971) and Ned J. Bowman v. White, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (Utah 1962). 
Plaintiff is obligated to show only (1) that she was a creditor 
of GAC; (2) that GAC was insolvent at the time the conveyance 
was made; and (3) that the conveyance was not made for a "fair 
consideration." This showing can be made "from the facts of each 
case and from the circumstances surrounding the transaction 
~- Plaintiff submits that there is sufficient evidence in the 
to make this showing. 
-3-
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(1) Creditor. A "creditor" is defined under the 
Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act as follows: " a person 
having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or 
unliquidated, absolute, fixed, or contingent." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-1-1 (1953). Intervenor does not challenge Plaintiff's 
status as a GAC creditor (R. 234 Ls. 19-23). Moreover, the 
promissory note (Exhibit 19-P) executed by GAC in favor of 
Plaintiff adequately demonstrates that Plaintiff was a GAC 
creditor. 
( 2) Insolvency. The Utah Frau'dulent Conveyances 
Act defines "insolvency" as follows: 
A person is insolvent when the present fair 
salable value of his assets is less than the 
amount that will be required to satisfy his 
probable liability on his existing debts as 
they become absolute and matured. Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-1-2 (1953). 
GAC's insolvency at the time it conveyed the caterpillar to 
Terra Corporation is adequately reflected in the record on 
appeal. 
First, Intervenor's own witness, Edward Coltharp, a 
stock broker who traded GAC stock, and a shareholder in GAC, 
testified that there was no market for GAC stock (R. 302) • 
This market inactivity was one indication of GAC's failing 
financial condition. 
. h t obJ' ection, that Second, Plaintiff testified, wit ou 
in February 1974 she loaned $12, 000. 00 (Exhibit 19-P) to GAC 
1" 
and l.·nsolvent condi"ti'on (R. 318 LS··' because of GAC's inactive 
a nr·: 
fact that GAC ha .. This condition is further reflected by the 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L 
filed annual reports with the Utah Secretary of State's office 
since 1971 and had not paid franchise taxes to the Utah State 
Tax cormnission since 1970 and, therefore, these government 
agencies had revoked GAC's certificate of authority to do 
business in Utah (Affidavit of David s. Cook in support of 
Motion to Dismiss Counter-Claim of GAC, R. 27). 
Third, Plaintiff testified, without objection, that 
in the spring and summer of 1974 GAC failed to make any payments 
on her loan (R. 328 L. 30 and R. 329 Ls. 1-4). See Larrimer v. 
Feeney, 192 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1963) ("Insolvency in the equity 
sense ... is the inability to meet obligations as they mature"). 
See also, Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-5 (1953). 
Finally, Plaintiff testified that her examination of 
GAC records revealed that GAC liabilities exceeded GAC assets 
(R. 34 Ls. 14-29). Intervenor objects to the admission of this 
testimony, claiming that it violates the best evidence rule 
found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-16 (1953). See Intervenor's 
Brief at 9-10. Plaintiff has several observations with respect 
to this objection. 
First, even without this testimony, as indicated above, 
there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support 
the lower court's finding that GAC was insolvent at the time 
it conveyed the caterpillar to Terra Corporation; and this 
evidence was not contradicted by Intervenor at trial. 
Second, both § 78-25-16 and Utah Rules of Evidence 70 
make an exception to the best evidence principle "when the 
-5-
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original has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of 
the loss or destruction must first be made." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-25-16 (1) (1953). This exception is consistent with the 
basic premise of the best evidence rule: 
The production-of-documents rule is principally 
aimed, not at securing a writing at all hazards 
and in every instance, but at securing the best 
obtainable evidence of its contents. Thus, if 
as a practical matter the document cannot be 
produced because it has been lost or destroyed, 
the production of the original is excused and 
other evidence of its contents becomes admissable. 
Failure to recognize this qualification of the 
basic rule would in many instances mean a return 
to the bygone and unlamented days in which to lose 
one's paper was to lose one's right. Recognition 
of the same qualification also squares with the 
ancillary purpose of the basic rule to protect 
against the perpetration of fraud, since proof 
that failure to produce the original is due to 
inability to do so tends logically to dispel the 
otherwise possible inference that the failure 
stems from design. (Emphasis in original.) 
D. McCormick, McCormick' s Handbook of the Law of 
Evidence§ 237 at 570 (2d Ed. 1972). i 
I 
Given this premise, courts generally require 
ably diligent search for original documentary evidence 
a reason· 1 
I 
before \ 
secondary evidence to prove the content of writings is admitted.: 
Id. at 570-571. Questions relative to the adequacy of this 
search are matters largely within the trial court's discretion. 
"Such discretion is particularly appropriate since the character 
of the search required to show the probability of loss or 
circum· destruction will, as a practical matter, depend on the 
stances of each case." 
·a nee Id. See also, J. H. Wigmore, ~
. of thi 
§ 1194 at 442 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972) " th determination ( • . . e 
sh' fact of ioss . 
sufficiency of the search and in general of the 
. ") (emphasis ;[. 
be left entirely to the trial court's discretion 
see 
original). h · approach. Utah has apparently followed t is 
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Stevens v. Gray, 259 P. 2d 889, 891 (Utah 1953) ("Ordinarily, 
if an explanation of failure to produce such record is satisfactory 
to the trial court it is within his discretion to receive other 
evidence concerning such facts") . Indeed, modern authorities 
suggest that it is a "waste of time" for appellate courts to 
review such discretionary rulings. See J. H. Wigrnore, Evidence 
§ 1195 at 445-446 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972). See also, D. McCormick, 
McCormick Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 243 at 577-578 (2d 
&l. 1972) (Admission of secondary evidence is harmless error in 
absence of good faith dispute relative to accuracy of secondary 
evidence). 
The record shows that Plaintiff made an adequate search 
for GAC's business records (R.339-340). These records were in 
the custody of GAC's president, Paul J. Angelos (R. 340 Ls. 10-12). 
Mr. Angelos, who was an adverse party in this action (R. 2-7) 
refused to grant Plaintiff access to these records (R. 339 Ls. 
27-30 R. 340 Ls. 1-3), even after Plaintiff had made requests 
for their production (R. 30-31) . This fact alone is sufficient 
to justify the lower court's admission of the disputed testimony. 
See J. H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1212 at 487 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972) 
("It is also often said that where the third person is hostile 
and fraudulently detains the document, this fact of itself 
suffices to excuse nonproduction, although such an instance is 
perhaps equally well disposed of by the doctrine of loss • • • ") 
(emphasis in original) . See also Snow v. Utah Automobile Dealers, 
188 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1948). Additionally, Mr. Angelos had left 
-7-
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the country; and, although he had come back to the United 
States, it was impossible to locate him (R. 340 Ls. 16-17). 
The lower court could reasonably have inf erred from these 
circumstances that Mr. Angelos was not within the State of 
Utah. Again, this fact alone is sufficient to justify the 
lower court's admission of the disputed testimony. See Utah 
Rules of Evidence 70 (1) (b); Johnson v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 100 P. 390, 395 (Utah 1909) (" ..• the letter in 
question was not within the jurisdiction of the court, and the 
rule, as declared by the great weight of authority, is that 
when a writing which is necessary in evidence is traced to 
the hands of a party not within the State, secondary evidence, 
without further showing, may be given to prove the contents 
of such writing") ; and Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper Mfg· 
Co., 47 P. 811, 812 (Utah 1896). Finally, Plaintiff made 
extensive personal efforts to locate Mr. Angelos (R. 340 
I 
Ls. 18-25). This evidence justifies the lower court's exercise! 
of discretion in admitting the disputed testimony. 
( 3) Fair Consideration. The Utah Fraudulent Conver 
ances Act defines "fair consideration" as follows: 
Fair consideration is given for property, or 
obligation: 
(1) When in exchange for such property, 
or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, 
and in good faith, property is conveyed or ~n 
antecedent debt is satisfied Utah Co~ 
Ann. § 25-1-3 (1953). 
-8- J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L 
Section 25-1-3 requires that the conveyance be made 
for both a "fair equivalence" and in "good faith." Thus, a 
showing that either of these elements is lacking is sufficient 
to support the lower court's finding of fraudulent conveyance 
in the present case. 
(a) Fair Equivalence. Although this court has 
indicated that fair equivalence does not mean exact equivalence 
or equal value, "fair valuation [does] mean such a price as a 
capable and diligent businessman could presently obtain for the 
property after conferring with those accustomed to buy such 
property" Utah Assets Corporation v. Dooley Brothers Association, 
70 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1937). Thus, for example, this court has 
upheld a lower court' s finding that giving $ 3 8 , 12 0. 0 0 in exchange 
for property with a proven worth of $290,000.00 (only 13% of the 
property's proven worth) was not a fair equivalence. See First 
Security Bank of Utah v. Vrontikis Brothers, Inc., 490 P.2d 1301 
(Utah 1971). Judged by this standard, the caterpillar's sale 
price to both Terra Corporation and Intervenor ($2,500.00) was 
grossly disproportionate to the caterpillar's real value ($20,000.00 
to $ 3 0 , 0 0 O . O O ) . 
Intervenor attacks the lower court's finding that the 
caterpillar was not sold for a fair equivalence on two grounds. 
First, Intervenor suggests that the court erred in basing its 
fair equivalence finding on retail rather than wholesale value. 
-9-
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Intervenor fails to cite any case supporting the proposition t 
wholesale rather than retail value should be used in ascertab.; 
I 
the fair equivalence of an alleged fraudulent conveyance. Th:, 
failure is not surprising in light of the Dooley court's fair ! 
equivalence standard: "Such a price as a capable and diligent: 
I 
businessman could presently obtain for the property after con:':~ 
with those accustomed to buy such property." Utah Assets cor ::. 
v. Dooley Brothers Association, 70 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1937), 
In seeming anticipation of this standard, Intervenor himself : 
testified that "I had the tractor sold for $20, 000, so that 
establishes a pretty good value." 
2 R. 279 Ls. 13-19.) 
(R. 278 Ls. 27-28. See als: ! 
In addition to his own testimony on this point, 
Intervenor produced two experts at trial. One expert, Mr. 
Coltharp, testified that the caterpillar's value was $20,000 
to $25,000 (R. 301 Ls. 21-29). Intervenor's other expert, 
Mr. Bateman, whose testimony is set forth in part in Intervenor'! 
: 
Brief at 7-8, testified that the caterpillar's wholesale value 
was approximately $10,750; but Mr. Bateman further testifiedtn: 
brokers of heavy equipment would raise this price to "whatever~ 
2According to Intervenor's Deposition, this $20'.0?0 price w~:tii 
based on the caterpillar in its present unrehab1litat7d c~~at 
(McCurtain Deposition at 26). Intervenor ~urther admi~! worth 
when necessary repairs are made the caterpillar could . oepo· 
as much as $30,000 (R. 290 Ls. 17-24. See also McCurtain 
sition at 42). 
-10- j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
market would stand." (R. 260 L. 8.) 3 
This evidence reveals considerable disparity between 
the caterpillar's fair value and the amount Intervenor actually 
paid for the caterpillar. Thus, it was not unreasonable for 
the lower court to rule that "fair consideration" was not given 
in exchange for the caterpillar. Even accepting Intervenor's 
wholesale figure of $10,750, it would not be unreasonable for 
the lower court to conclude that 25% of value was not "fair 
consideration" under the circumstances of the present case. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that each decision 
as to the fairness of consideration in fraudulent conveyance 
cases must be made from the standpoint of creditors. se·e Larrirner 
v. Feeney, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. 1963) and Osawa v. Orishi, 
206 P. 2d 498, 504 (Wash. 1949). 
Second, Intervenor contends that he paid more than 
$2,500 for the caterpillar because he had an oral agreement to 
split profits with H. E. Thomas, president of Terra Corporation, 
in the event that Intervenor resold the caterpillar. However, the 
lower court could have found this testimony implausible for 
several reasons. 
3
It is possible that the lower court attached greater weight 
to the testimony of Intervenor and Mr. Coltharp with respect 
t~ the caterpillar's value because (1) counsel for Intervenor in-
sisted ii;i his opening remarks that "the evidence wil~ sho~ the 
tr~ctor is worth approximately $20, 000-twenty to thirty is my 
client's opinion and he is a dealer" (R. 236 Ls. 25-57) 
(even on appeal, Intervenor insists that, for purposes of 
~ssessing wrongful attachment damages against Plaintiff $20,000 
is the proper figure, see Intervenor's Brief at 11-12); and 
because (2) Mr. Bateman's testimony was substantially impeached 
at trial (R. 261-270). 
-11-
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First, the written documents accompanying Terra 
Corporation's sale of the caterpillar to Intervenor made no 
mention of a profit sharing agreement. Indeed, the bill of 
sale (Exhibit 16-D) specifically recites that the "caterpillar 
is free and clear of any liens, claims or demands of any persa: 
whatsoever .•• " 
Second, after purchasing the caterpillar from Terra 
i 
Corporation, Intervenor pledged it for a $6,000 bank loan. Thi:: 
I 
pledge agreement bore only Intervenor's and not Terra Corporat:::I 
signature (R. 289 Ls. 18-23). It seems improbable that a ba~'. ! 
would loan $6, 000 without first ascertaining and binding every ! 
party who had any interest in the loan collateral. Indeed, the 
pledge agreement (R. 182) specifically recites at paragu~S 
that "the debtor is ... the owner of the collateral ... [and] 
the collateral is ..• free and clear of all liens, claims, char::! 
encumbrances, taxes and assessments," and at paragroph 71•11ll 
Intervenor promises to "keep the collateral free from all liens, I 
I 
claims, charges, encumbrances, taxes and assessments." r 
Finally, the profit sharing agreement is arguably 
inconsistent with Intervenor's testimony that he purchased the 
caterpillar "sight unseen" because of its extraordinarily ~w 
price (R. 296 Ls. 21-27. See also R. 284 Ls. 27-30). 
All of these facts could have persuaded the lower 
corpora tic 
court that the caterpillar was not purchased by Terra 
· of 
and Intervenor for a "fair equivalence" within the meaning 
the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act. 
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(b) Good Faith. Not only must Intervenor show that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the lower court's 
findings with respect to the "fair equivalence" issue, but also 
Intervenor must show the same insufficiency with respect to the 
"good faith" of the Terra Corporation-Intervenor transaction. 
Intervenor claims that he purchased the caterpillar 
in "good faith" because "there is no evidence in the record 
indicating [Intervenor] had previous knowledge of any fraudu-
lent intent." Intervenor's Brief at 9. However, the statute 
which Intervenor relies on in support of this claim does not 
speak in terms of "previous knowledge" but rather in terms of 
"previous notice." See Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-13 (1953). In 
Utah "whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put 
[Intervenor] on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of 
everything to which such inquiry might have led." McGarry v. 
Thompson, 261 P.2d 288, 290 (Utah 1948). There was consider-
able evidence at trial from which the lower court could have 
found that Intervenor was put on notice that all was not right 
with respect to his purchase of the caterpillar. 
1. Intervenor himself testified that the caterpillar's 
low purchase price was unusual. 
L 
Q. Mr. McCurtain, you've said that this was a 
normal transaction. I'm confused by what you meant as 
"normal." Is it normal to purchase a caterpillar tractor 
for 10% of its value in the trade; is that a normal 
transaction in your dealings in heavy equipment, or is 
that a little unusual to have that kind of a deal? 
-13-
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A. That is unusual. (R. 296 Ls. 21-27.) 
In fact, the caterpillar's purchase price was 
so unusually low that Intervenor did not bother to inspect 
the caterpillar before purchasing it. 
Q. Is it your custom, Mr. McCurtain, to purchase 
heavy equipment sight unseen? 
A. When they' re as low priced as that equipment 
is, it certainly is. (R. 284 Ls. 27-30. See also R. 
288 Ls. 20-25.) 
2. There was evidence to suggest that the Terra 
Corporation-Intervenor transaction was a "sham"; and that, 
despite the appearance of a conveyance from Terra Corporation 
to Intervenor, GAC and Terra Corporation actually retained 
"possession" of the caterpillar. The Utah Fraudulent Conveyanc'i 
Act defines this circumstance as "conclusive evidence of frauc J 
as against ••. creditors •.• " Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-14 (1953), 
i 
See also, Givan v. Lambeth, 251 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah 1960) (defi: 
this circumstance as a "badge of fraud"). 
Terra Corporation purportedly sold the caterpillar tc 1 
Intervenor on July 9, 1974 (Exhibits 15-D and 16-D). However, 
the caterpillar was hauled at Terra Corporation's request into! 
I 
Wheeler Machinery Company's yard on July 18, 1974 (R. 24?L5··1 
23 and Exhibits 2-D and 3-D. See also R. 252 Ls. 3-12). There-
d Mr sat( 
after, GAC and Terra Corporation principals requeste · 
. · 11 r (R. 269 t 
a heavy equipment dealer, to inspect the caterpi a I 
Bateman to make , Ls. 10-13) • These same principals wanted Mr. 
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l 
offer to purchase the caterpillar (R. 270 Ls. 4-6). In October, 
1974, these principals requested a Burt Gallo to do repair work 
on the caterpillar (Affidavit of Juanita J. Meyer in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ,, 11, R. 83-88) and 
GAC's attorney proposed to Plaintiff that GAC sell the caterpillar 
to a buyer in Emery County, Utah and split the proceeds with 
Plaintiff (Id. ,, 13). During this same time period, Wheeler 
notified GAC that storage charges were being assessed against 
the caterpillar (R. 254-255) and Wheeler billed Terra Corporation 
for those charges (Exhibit 2-D). The lower court could have 
found these circumstances suspect in light of GAC's professed 
sale of the caterpillar to Terra Corporation on July 8, i974, 
and Terra Corporation's professed resale of the caterpillar to 
Intervenor on July 9, 197 4. 4 
Intervenor did not attempt to remove the caterpillar from 
Wheeler's yard from July 9, 1974 when he allegedly purchased 
the caterpillar until almost a year later in April, 1975 when 
he filed his complaint in intervention in the present case. 
4 
Terra Corporation may argue that it incurred these added 
expenses and took this added interest in the caterpillar 
because of its supposed agreement to split profits with 
Intervenor in the event that he resold the caterpillar. 
~owever, this reasoning does not explain GAC's continued 
interest in the caterpillar. Moreover, this reasoning is 
inconsistent with Mr. Thomas' testimony that Terra Corporation 
~as willing to sell the caterpillar for only $2,500 because 
'.-t had no experience in heavy equipment dealing and because 
it wanted to break even at $2,500 with its sale of the 
caterpillar to Intervenor (R 308 Ls. 38-30, R. 309 Ls. 1-9. 
See also R. 313 Ls. 2-9, R. 314 Ls. 9-12). 
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Intervenor may argue that he was unable to remo th 
ve e caterpit: 
because Plaintiff's counsel had instructed Wheeler 
not to rel'", 
the caterpillar. However, Plaintiff's counsel had t ~.I no attach,: 
the caterpillar at that point in time. Intervenor made no ; 
effort whatsoever, e.g., by legal process or even by contacti::: 
I 
Plaintiff's counsel, to remove the caterpillar. Indeed, after ! 
being notified by Wheeler in July that Plaintiff asserted an 
interest in the caterpillar, Intervenor nevertheless returned 
to Wyoming and solicited offers for resale of the caterpillar 
(R. 291-292). The lower court could have found that this was 
abnormal behavior in light of Intervenor's professed concern 
about removal of the caterpillar from Wheeler's yard. 
Even as late as October, 1974, when Plaintiff final~ 
threatened to attach the caterpillar, Paul Angelos, president 
of GAC, and not Intervenor, responded to this threat. Mr. 
Angelos' attorney wrote to Wheeler informing them that "Paul 
Angelos will deliver this letter to you and will expect to 
remove the D-9 caterpillar upon paying your bill for its 
repairs." (Exhibit 6-D. See also R. 248 Ls. 21-25.) Again, 
the lower court could have found such a letter anomalous in 
light of GAC' s purported sale of the caterpillar to Terra 
· 1974 The lower court could have further Corporation in July, . 
Of the caterpillar, found it odd that the purportedly true owner 
Intervenor, failed to take steps during this time period to 
protect his interest in the caterpillar. 
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L 
Finally, evidence that Terra Corporation filed a 
financing statement against the caterpillar after Plaintiff 
attached the caterpillar (compare Exhibit 1-D and R. 13-14) 
and when Terra Corporation supposedly had no further interest 
in the caterpillar could have convinced the lower court that 
there was a collusive scheme to defraud Plaintiff as between 
GAC, Terra Corporation and Intervenor. 5 
All of the facts outlined above suggest that GAC 
and Terra Corporation were in constructive possession of the 
caterpillar throughout 1974 and that no delivery of the 
caterpillar was made to Intervenor when such delivery was 
possible. Under the mandate of § 25-1-14 the lower court 
could have treated these circumstances as conclusive evidence 
of a scheme to defraud Plaintiff. 
3. Finally, there was evidence to suggest that the 
principals of GAC and Terra Corporation and Intervenor were 
attempting to "keep secret" their transactions with respect to 
the caterpillar. This court has also labeled these circumstances 
5 
.The ~ewer court's suspicions could have been further aroused 
1~ ~his regard by the fact that Plaintiff was precluded from 
~iling her own financing statement against the caterpillar 
in the early summer of 1974 because her statement lacked the 
debtor, GAC's, signature. This signature may have been 
fraudulently withheld from Plaintiff (see Affidavit of 
Juanita J. Meyer in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 11 9, R. 83-88) • 
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as a "badge of fraud." See Givans v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 95 91 Ii: 
(Utah 1960) • 
Plaintiff testified that she made extensive efforts 
over a period of months to communicate with GAC and Terra 
Corporation principals but received no response from them (R, 
i 
329-331 and Exhibit 7-D. See also R. 331 Ls. 20-30 and R. lll 
Ls. 1-2) . Intervenor's failure during this same time period, 
despite his knowledge of Plaintiff's asserted claim in the 
caterpillar, to come forward and notify Plaintiff of his 
asserted claim in the caterpillar could have also aroused the 
suspicions of the lower court. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff submits 
that the trial court was justified in finding that the Terra 
Corporation-Intervenor transaction was not made in "good faith'' 
and, therefore, violated the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act. 
III. PLAINTIFF IS NOT LIABLE TO INTERVENOR 
OF THE CATERPILLAR. 
FOR WRONGFUL ATTAC~1 
! 
Intervenor argues in his Brief at 11-12 that he ~ 
entitled to damages for Plaintiff's "wrongful attachment" and 
"conversion" 6 of the caterpillar. 
i 
6 . d a convers:\ Intervenor's complaint does not plead conversion an or• 
claim was not tried in the lower court. Therefore, Interven q,,I 
. . . . . 1 see e .. 
cannot raise this issue for the first time on appea · h 19101. 
Simpson":· General Motors Corp:, 47? P.2d 399, 4~1 (U~af at 1 
Examination of the two cases cited in Intervenor s Brie thus ! 
11-12 reveals that they are both conversion cases and are i 
inapposite. i 
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Intervenor's Complaint (R. 50-53) attempts to state 
two claims. The second claim is for malicious prosecution and 
abuse of process. Intervenor waived this claim at trial (R.233 
Ls. 24-29). This left Intervenor's first claim, which he 
characterizes on appeal as a claim for wrongful attachment 
(R. 233 L. 30 and 234 Ls. 1-4). 
However, it appears that Intervenor's second claim is 
in reality his claim for wrongful attachment. "It is well 
settled that an action may be maintained against the attaching 
plaintiff for a wrongful and malicious attachment, this being 
in the nature of a malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of 
process and governed by essentially the same rules." 7 C.J ;s. 
Attachment § 516 at 663 (1937). If so, then by waiving his 
second claim at trial, Intervenor has waived his wrongful 
attachment claim. 
Even assuming that Intervenor has not waived and has 
properly plead a wrongful attachment claim, 7 Intervenor must 
show that Plaintiff was actuated by malice or that she acted 
wrongfully before he can prevail on this claim. 
7
Intervenor's Complaint contains no allegation that Plaintiff 
lacked probable cause in procuring her writ of attachment. One 
early Utah case suggests that such an allegation is necessary to 
state a claim for wrongful attachment. See Cahoon v. Hoggan, 
86 P. 763, 764 (Utah 1906). But cf. Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. 
Western States Wh. Sup., 451 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1969) (dictum)· 
Mor7ov7r, Count I of Intervenor's Complaint does not allege t~a~ 
Plaintiff's attachment of the caterpillar was wrongful or malicious. 
Under Utah law it is clear that such an allegation is necessary 
to state a claim for wrongful attachment. See Cahoon v. Hoggan, 86 P. 763, 764 (Utah 1906). Cf. Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. 
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See Cahoon v. Hoggan, 86 P. 763, 764 (Utah 1906). See also 
Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Wh. Sup., 451 P.: 
778, 783 (Utah 1969) (dictum) and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co,·. 
-Love, 195 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1921) (dictum). 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to 
indicate that Plaintiff acted either wrongfully or with 
malice. The record reveals no procedural irregularities with 
respect to Plaintiff's writ of attachment (R. 3-14); Terra 
Corporation did not file its financing statement, thereby 
giving Plaintiff constructive notice of an adverse claim oo ' 
the caterpillar, until after Plaintiff had obtained her writ:: 
attachment (compare R. 3-14 with Exhibit 1-D); and Plaintiff j 
I 
testified, without contradiction, that the first time she had,,' 
heard of Intervenor was when he filed his Complaint in this a:·.! 
(R. 332 Ls. 3-8). Under these circumstances, the lower court 1 
! 
could not have found that Plaintiff wrongfully or maliciously i 
attached the caterpillar; especially in light of Plaintiff's qj 
faith efforts throughout 1974 to locate individuals who clairoe:I 
any interest in the caterpillar and Intervenor's unresponsiven,f 
to those efforts,despite his obvious ability to respond. I I 
I 
Western States Wh. Sup., 451 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1969) (dict~,i 
(" ••• the jury should have had a chance to determine wheth~f50: 
not the actions of the landlord were a mere subterfuge to 'd~ 
the tenants and thus be unlawful and malicious under the evi · 
. . . k d co v Love, given in this case") and St. Joseph Stec Yar s : ~t: 
195 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1921) (dictum) ("Moreover, if ac~usec 
is actuated by malice and acts without proba~le ~r any out:: 
bringing an action, and is guilty of oppression in suin~·ng 
attachment, anyone may obtain relief in a proper procee /onlY I 
against such malice and oppression, and may recover, no we11': 
his actual damages, but may recover exemplary damages) as 
See generally 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 516 at 663 (1937 · 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff, therefore, concludes that Intervenor's request for 
damages for wrongful attachment,in the event the court chooses 
to reverse on the fraudulent conveyance issue, is not well-founded.a 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully 
submits that the lower court's judgment in the present case 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of March, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jerry w. James 
IRVINE SMITH & MABEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
8 
It appears that the court could not assess damages in excess of 
$10,000 in any event. U.R.C.P. 64(C) (b) provides that individuals 
suing for a writ of attachment must file a written undertaking. 
Plaintiff has done this in the present case in the amount of 
$10,000 (see Intervenor's Complaint ,f 14, R. 50-54). The Rule ~urther provides that" ... if the attachment is wrongfully 
issued, the Plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to 
the defendant and all damages which he may sustain by reason of 
the att~chment, not exceeding the sum specified in the undertaking." (Emphasis supplied.) 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 
day of March, 1977, two copies of the foregoing Brief were 
mailed to Richard J. Leedy, Esq., 2795 Comanche Drive, Sal: 
Lake City, Utah 84108. 
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IN THE SUPllEME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
M. B. POWERS, JAMES M. 
POWERS and VERN PETERSON, 
dba POWERS AND PETERSEN, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
GENE'S BUILDING MATERIALS, 
INC., 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 14812 
FI l ED 
---------------------------------~----------------M.A.Y_~_~J8ZZ _______ _ 
......,_ _______________________________________ = 
STATE OF UTAH Clerk, Supromo Court, Utah 
SS. 
County of Salt Lake 
This affiant, Matt Biljanic, being first duly sworn on his oath, 
deposes and says, as follows: 
1. That the affiant herein is the attorney for the Defendant/ 
Appellant, Gene's Building Materials, Inc. 
2. That the trial in this matter was scheduled for hearing on 
September 1, 1976. That this affiant received notification from the Clerk's 
Office at approximately 9:30 A. M., September 1, 1976, that the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft was to be the presiding judge in this case. 
3. This affiant did not have an opportunity to prepare an Affidavit 
of Prejudice; however, this affiant spent twenty minutes prior to the begin-
ning of the trial in chambers with the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, specifying 
the reasona why the Honorable Bryant H. Croft should assign the case to 
another judge and honor the oral request of this affiant to so remove himself. 
The conference with the Honorable Bryant H. Croft was outside the presence 
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of opposing counsel, based upon this affiant's judgment that the personal 
feelings that might have existed between this affiant and the Court should 
not have been discussed openly. 
4. That the Honorable Bryant H. Croft denied this affiants request 
to withdraw from the case even though other judges were available to hear 
the matter. 
DATED this d/J- day of April, 1977. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .;J/ef day of 
April, 1977. 
My Commission Expires: 
~CL bf Ifft) 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certliy that I mailed a true and correct cow of the fore-
going Affidavit to Richard H. Thornley, attorney for Plaintlifs/Respondents, 
2610 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, 84401, postage prepaid, this 
7,/{/ day of April, 1977. 
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